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Unemployment, Wages and  
Collective Bargaining in the European Union 
 
Eckhard Hein and Thorsten Schulten 
 
Abstract 
The paper questions the predominant view on unemployment and wages in the European Un-
ion according to which high unemployment is primarily caused by labour market rigidities, 
i.e. social institutions and regulations which prevent “market-clearing” real wage levels and 
structures. It is shown that the foundations of that view coming either from neo-classical or 
new-Keynesian theory are not convincing, neither theoretically nor empirically. Analysing the 
developments in the EU during the last four decades, no strictly inverse relationship between 
real wage growth and unemployment can be found. On the contrary, persistently high unem-
ployment has had strong adverse effects on nominal wage growth and on the labour income 
share. Weakened labour union bargaining power and changing collective bargaining strategies 
have contributed to this result. It is therefore concluded that the current EU economic and 
employment policies aiming at further wage restraint, wage differentiation and decentralisa-
tion of collective bargaining are deeply misguided and have to be replaced by an alternative 
wage policy in Europe as part of a growth and employment oriented coordination of macro-
economic policies. 
 
JEL classification: E24, J50 
Keywords: European employment policy, wage theory, wage trends, collective bargaining 
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1. Introduction 
According to the mainstream among European economists and politicians the relation be-
tween unemployment, wages and collective bargaining seems to be rather simple. Persistent 
unemployment is – according to that view – the result of imperfections in the labour market 
caused by social institutions and regulations which prevent “market-clearing” wage levels and 
wage structures. Consequently, the responsibility for the persistently high unemployment in 
the European Union (EU) is given to so-called “structural” reasons which are mainly associ-
ated with a malfunctioning of labour market institutions such as collective bargaining, labour 
legislation and social security systems. 
This view is currently highly influential among the EU-institutions and determines their pol-
icy recommendations in tackling the unemployment problem. The “Broad Economic Policy 
Guidelines”, for example, which have been regularly adopted by the European Council since 
the mid-1990s and could be seen as the most important EU document on economic policy, 
have called again and again for a policy of wage restraint and increasing wage differentials 
(European Commission 2003a). The same requirements come from the European Central 
Bank (ECB) which regularly demands structural reforms in the labour market and is perma-
nently warning off trade unions for claiming wage increases which it considers too high. Con-
sidering this, it is no surprise that the major approach to fighting unemployment within the 
EU is the “European Employment Strategy (EES)” which focuses almost exclusively on la-
bour market reforms. 
Regarding wage policy and collective bargaining, the recommendations made by the various 
EU institutions could be summarised in three points. First, they call for a policy of wage re-
straint, i.e. as long as there is persistent unemployment real wage increases should be below 
productivity growth in order to strengthen the competitiveness and profitability of the firms. 
Secondly, they demand a more differentiated wage structure which should reflect the different 
levels of productivity at regional and firm levels. Thereby, wage differentiation is often used 
as a euphemism for extending the low-wage sector. Finally, to adopt such a policy of wage 
restraint and wage differentiation a further decentralisation of collective bargaining is recom-
mended. 
The problem with this approach is that it is simply not convincing. Neither on the theoretical 
nor the empirical level can a strictly inverse relationship between the real wage rate and the 
level of unemployment be derived. Likewise there is also no strictly positive relationship be-
tween the degree of labour market regulation or the degree of wage bargaining co-ordination 
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on the one hand and unemployment on the other hand. In the present paper we will therefore 
scrutinise the dominant view in the EU concerning labour market rigidity, wages and unem-
ployment. We provide an alternative view which assumes that the level of employment is not 
determined in the labour market but by the overall level of economic activity in the goods 
market. Wages should therefore not only be considered as labour costs, but also play an im-
portant role for consumption demand and for the stabilisation of the price level in order to 
prevent both inflationary and deflationary tendencies. In our view, wages have no direct and 
immediate effect on unemployment. Unemployment has rather to be considered as a crucial 
determinant of wage developments, because the ‘industrial reserve army’ effect (Marx 1867: 
762-801) systematically weakens the bargaining power of trade unions and threatens the es-
tablished institutions of collective bargaining. 
Consequently, structural reforms in the labour markets and decentralisation of wage bargain-
ing will not be able to improve growth and employment in the EU but will weaken economic 
performance and contribute to the deterioration of the living conditions of a majority of peo-
ple. In order to fight unemployment an alternative economic policy approach has to be pur-
sued. This approach has to overcome the current neo-monetarist regime in which monetary 
policy is exclusively geared towards price stability, and fiscal policy is primarily committed 
to super-cyclical budget consolidation. Instead a growth and employment-oriented European 
coordination of macroeconomic policy is required, in which monetary and fiscal policies are 
responsible for growth and employment. Within such a framework wage policy would have to 
fulfil its macroeconomic task of stabilising both consumer demand and the overall price de-
velopment. Such a macroeconomic-oriented wage policy requires a political re-strengthening 
of collective bargaining institutions which allows for a coordinated wage policy both at na-
tional levels and at the European level. 
The present paper has the following structure. In Section 2 we discuss the theory behind the 
predominant view on unemployment and wages in the EU and show that it is not convincing 
and has therefore to be replaced by an alternative view. Section 3 deals with the empirics of 
the developments of wages and employment in the old EU (EU 15) as a whole and in France, 
Germany and the UK in particular and compares them to the US. Section 4 discusses the ef-
fects of mass unemployment on collective bargaining and the changing power relations be-
tween trade unions and employers which lead to new hegemonic arrangements of wage for-
mation. In Section 5 we will draw some final conclusions for an alternative wage policy in 
Europe as part of a growth and employment oriented coordination of macroeconomic policy. 
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2. On the theory of wages and unemployment 
The predominant view in the EU on wages and employment is theoretically based either on a 
simple neoclassical labour market view or on a more modern new-Keynesian concept of a 
Non-Accelerating-Inflation-Rate-of-Unemployment (NAIRU).1 In the neoclassical labour 
market view, whenever there is involuntary unemployment it can be wiped out by means of 
reducing the real wage rate in the labour market. This requires, on the one hand, that nominal 
wage variations have no effect on the price level and therefore translate into real wage varia-
tions. On the other hand, this view requires that Say’s Law holds, i.e. effective demand by 
households and firms in the goods market is always sufficient to take up the goods produced 
and supplied by firms.  
In modern new-Keynesian theory this view is rejected because changes in nominal wage costs 
will affect prices when firms set their prices according to a mark-up on unit costs in imperfect 
goods markets. Also Say’s Law cannot be assumed to hold in each case when prices are far 
from being perfectly flexible in the face of shifts of demand. As a result, in the new-
Keynesian models monetary and fiscal policies can affect employment in the short run, via 
the impact that these policies have on effective demand in the goods market. In the long run, 
however, unemployment is determined by the NAIRU which is itself dependent on structural 
factors of the labour market, the wage bargaining and the social security system. As such, the 
NAIRU describes the unemployment rate at which the distribution claims by employees and 
employers do not result in any increase or decrease in the inflation rate. Various new-
Keynesian models have been put forward to determine the NAIRU: wage bargaining models 
in which the wage rate and employment depend on bargaining powers of trade unions and 
employers, efficiency wage models in which the real wage rate exerts a positive impact on 
productivity (shirking or fairness models) or models in which the minimum real wage rate is 
determined by social benefits (Blanchard and Katz 1997). When unemployment falls below 
the NAIRU in these models, inflation rises, and when unemployment climbs above the 
NAIRU the result is disinflation and deflation. 
What are the forces adjusting the rate of unemployment determined by effective demand in 
the goods market to the NAIRU? Here modern new-Keynesian models require both symmet-
rical interventions by the central bank and symmetrical effects of monetary policy on the de-
mand for goods. This means that it is the central bank which has to intervene as soon as un-
                                                          
1 See Snowdon, Vane and Wynarcyk (1994) for a textbook treatment of different schools of thought in 
macroeconomic theory. 
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employment falls below the NAIRU and inflation accelerates, but also as soon as unemploy-
ment climbs above the NAIRU and inflation decelerates. It is also assumed that such a sym-
metric central bank-reaction function will be effective, i.e. rising interest rates will always 
have a depressing effect on effective demand and hence on employment whereas falling inter-
est rates always stimulate effective demand and employment. 
According to the new-Keynesian view, in the long term, however, monetary policy has no 
influence on unemployment which is determined by structural supply side factors only. 
Therefore, in order to reduce unemployment, the bargaining power of trade unions and em-
ployed ‘insiders’ has to be reduced. To achieve this, employment protection legislation has to 
be dismantled, the legal conditions for wage conflict and strikes have to be confined, and hu-
man capital as well as mobility of unemployed ‘outsiders’ have to be improved in order to 
increase effective competition in the labour market. Finally, wage bargaining decentralisation 
is supposed to allow for a higher degree of wage dispersion and the adjustment of wages to 
work place productivity. These measures are said to reduce upward wage pressure and to al-
low for higher employment at a constant inflation rate. Assuming a given production technol-
ogy with decreasing returns, rising employment is accompanied by a lower (average) real 
wage rate and we once again get the inverse relationship between employment and the real 
wage rate which is quite familiar from the simple neoclassical labour market. 
This new-Keynesian view, however, also suffers from some serious deficiencies. Structural 
reforms in the labour market and the wage bargaining systems have an impact only on nomi-
nal wages determined in the labour market, and not on real wages, if we assume - as in the 
new-Keynesian approach - that in imperfect commodity markets, prices come about as a re-
sult of a mark-up being added to unit labour costs. For this reason, downward nominal wage 
differentiation and general wage restraint initially have an effect only on prices, and can only 
exert a possible influence on growth and employment if the central bank rewards this wages 
policy with a symmetrical and consequently more expansive monetary policy (Allsopp and 
Vines 1998). What is required in order for structural reforms in the labour market and con-
comitant nominal wage moderation to potentially lower the actual level of unemployment, is 
an employment and growth-oriented monetary policy which stimulates investment and effec-
tive demand. However, as a lot of papers on ECB policies have convincingly shown, this was 
not the case in the first years of EMU (Allsopp 2002, Bibow 2002, Hein 2002b). 
But even if the central bank were to act in a more growth and employment friendly manner, 
the pursuit of a strategy aimed at reducing unemployment by deregulating the labour market, 
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decentralising wage bargaining and enforcing nominal wage moderation on employees would 
entail a further risk. This kind of policy must not only rely on a symmetrical central bank-
reaction function as described above, but this policy also requires that monetary policy has a 
symmetrical effect which guarantees that unemployment determined by effective demand in 
the goods market adjusts to the NAIRU determined by structural factors in the labour market 
(Hein 2004). This, however, is very unlikely: In the short term, monetary policy may be able 
to choke a cumulative inflationary process caused by excessively low unemployment by 
means of applying the interest rate brake, thus curbing effective demand for goods and in-
creasing unemployment. If however, during a recession, unemployment rises significantly 
above the NAIRU, leading to disinflation and ultimately deflation, then an interest rate cut 
may not be enough to stimulate an economic recovery, when firms have depressed profit ex-
pectations and are affected by debt deflation. Falling unit labour costs or even falling nominal 
wages will in this case exacerbate the recession and will not contribute to economic recovery. 
This has already been made clear by Keynes (1936: 262-271) and also follows from modern 
post-Keynesian theories.2 In this view the NAIRU can at best constitute a short-term em-
ployment barrier enforced by monetary policy, but it is not a long term equilibrium to which 
actual unemployment adjusts.3 
According to Keynes and the post-Keynesians, price levels can be expected to drop, when 
sustained high unemployment leads to falling nominal wages or unit labour costs. But the fall 
in prices may not necessarily have the same extent as the fall in nominal unit labour costs, 
owing to specific price rigidities in the commodity market (Kalecki 1969: 56). If reductions in 
unit labour costs are not fully passed on to consumers in the shape of price cuts, the result is a 
redistribution at the expense of wage earners and a concomitant fall in this group’s consump-
tion demand. However, if domestic prices fall in an open economy, the balance of trade im-
proves, as long as this is not counteracted by the exchange rate or unit labour cost trends 
abroad, although this is likely if there are long-term disequilibria in the balance of trade. If 
households and businesses expect nominal wages and prices to continue to fall, consumption 
expenditures and investments are postponed and current effective demand declines. Even if 
the central bank cuts interest rates in the face of a deflationary recession, the potential expan-
                                                          
2 See also Kalecki (1969: 55-59). For the post-Keynesian view on wages and prices see Kalecki (1954: 
11-27) and Lavoie (2001). 
3 In contrast to the new-Keynesian view, the post-Keynesian approach sees no reason to assume that the 
unemployment rate determined by effective demand in the commodity market will adjust to the 
NAIRU, which is determined by structural and supply-side factors (Sawyer 2001, 2002). On the con-
trary, it can be shown that in the long term the NAIRU adjusts endogenously to the actual unemploy-
ment rate (Hein 2004). 
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sive effect on investment and consumption is counteracted by the fact that in a modern credit 
money economy falling prices imply a redistribution of wealth from debtors to creditors with 
the associated risk of over-indebtedness. This debt deflation effect (Fisher 1933) serves to 
dampen investment and consumption if the realistic assumption is made that creditors are less 
inclined to spend than are debtors. Furthermore, it is more difficult to obtain credit to finance 
spending in a debt deflation scenario, since banks’ and financial intermediaries’ lending pol-
icy is determined by the creditworthiness of households and firms applying for loans, and 
their real indebtedness is an important indicator of how creditworthy they are. 
If one realistically assumes the characteristics of a modern credit money economy as de-
scribed in this post-Keynesian approach, it can thus be said that in times of recession, wage 
trends are the anchor to prevent deflationary processes, even if the monetary policy response 
also favours growth and employment. Organised labour markets, effective wage bargaining 
co-ordination and rigid nominal wages should therefore not be considered as obstacles to 
more employment and growth but rather as macroeconomic stabilisers and preconditions for a 
better macroeconomic performance. From this it also follows that instead of using the mone-
tary policy instrument in case of inadequate wage developments, macroeconomic wage exter-
nalities can be internalised more effectively by taking a macroeconomic approach to co-
ordinating wages policy.4 In this approach nominal wage growth rates should be determined 
by the sum of long-term productivity growth for the economy as a whole and the central 
bank’s inflation target. Nominal unit labour costs growth should therefore be equal to the tar-
get rate of inflation of the central bank. This firstly means that ‘effective co-ordination’ of 
wage bargaining is able to reduce inflationary pressures when employment is rising and in so 
doing to lower the employment limit expressed in the NAIRU.5 Such a course makes it possi-
ble for the central bank to tolerate a higher level of employment while still meeting its infla-
tion target. Secondly, during a phase of rising unemployment, co-ordinated wage bargaining 
can lessen the pressure for wage reductions and thereby reduce the risk of macroeconomically 
destabilising deflationary processes. 
 
                                                          
4 This has been shown recently in a series of studies on the interaction between wage bargaining systems 
and independent central banks. Franzese (2001), Soskice and Iversen (2001) and Hein (2002a) each pre-
sent overviews containing implications for the EMU. 
5 What is meant here by ‘effective co-ordination’ of wages policy is a functioning horizontal co-
ordination between the sectors of industry which is accompanied by a functioning vertical co-ordination 
within the sectors (Traxler et. al. 2001), which solves the problem of implementation and prevents earn-
ings drift and wage dumping. 
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3. Wages, prices and unemployment - a look at the data 
In order to assess the relevance of the neoclassical or new-Keynesian view on wages and em-
ployment underlying the deregulationist labour market policies in the EU compared to the 
alternative post-Keynesian view, in the following paragraphs we will analyse the development 
of the unemployment rate, the inflation rate, the growth rates of nominal and real wages and 
the labour income share from 1960 until 2004 (Table 1, see also the Figures in the appendix). 
Our analysis focuses on the development in the old EU countries as a whole (EU 15), but we 
will also take a look at the developments in the largest EU countries -Germany, France and 
the UK- and compare them with the USA. Since the variables in question display marked cy-
clical fluctuations we will only make some statements about middle to long term trends when 
analysing the relationships between these variables. 
 
Real wages and employment 
For the neoclassical and new-Keynesian view to claim empirical relevance, we should ob-
serve a close long term relationship between real wage growth and the unemployment rate, 
i.e. falling (rising) real wage growth should be associated with falling (rising) unemployment. 
For the EU 15 this is definitely not the case: Periods of steeply rising unemployment rates in 
the mid 1970s, the first half of the 1980s and the early 1990s were associated with falling 
growth rates of real compensation per employee (Table 1 and Figure 1). And the reduction in 
unemployment since the mid 1990s has been accompanied by a slight increase in real wage 
growth. For the US we find a similar picture contradicting the neoclassical and new-
Keynesian claims: increasing unemployment from the late 1960s to the early 1980s was asso-
ciated with a decrease in real wage growth, whereas the decrease in the unemployment rate 
since the mid 1990s has been accompanied by a slight tendency of increasing real wage 
growth (Table 1). Only the US development from the mid 1980s to the early 1990s is in ac-
cordance with the neoclassical and the new-Keynesian view: we see a parallel development of 
unemployment and real wage growth. Taking a look at the developments in Germany, France 
and the UK our general conclusion is confirmed: there is no stable long rung term positive 
relationship between real wage growth and unemployment. On the contrary, in general we 
find an inverse relationship between the two variables, i.e. rising unemployment is associated 
with falling real wage growth, and there are only a few short periods in which the neoclassical 
and new-Keynesian assertion seems to hold, for example in the UK in the early 1990s or in 
France since the late 1990s. 
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Table 1: Unemployment rate, inflation rate, nominal wage growth, real wage growth, labour income share  
in the EU, Germany, France, the UK and the USA, 1960 - 2004, 5-years annual average values, in % 
 
    1960-1964 1965-1969 1970-1974 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1996-1999 2000-2004
EU15           Unemployment rate 1.9 2.2 2.4 4.5 7.7 8.9 8.9 9.7 7.8
 Inflation rate1  3.6         3.7 8.0 10.4 9.8 4.2 4.5 2.1 2.0
 Nominal compensation per employee2          9.1 8.1 13.5 12.1 9.1 5.1 4.3 3.1 3.0
 Real compensation per employee3           5.3 4.3 4.8 2.6 0.3 1.4 1.2 0.5 1.2
 Labour income share4 72.3         72.2 72.8 74.6 74.1 70.9 70.6 68.3 68.5
Germany5           Unemployment rate 0.5 0.8 0.9 3.1 5.2 6.4 6.5 8.8 8.5
 Inflation rate1  2.9         2.4 5.6 4.0 4.5 1.2 3.5 1.4 1.3
 Nominal compensation per employee2          8.4 7.3 12.0 6.4 4.2 2.8 5.6 1.6 1.7
 Real compensation per employee3           5.4 4.8 6.0 2.3 -0.3 1.6 2.1 0.2 0.4
 Labour income share4 70.2         69.5 71.8 72.1 71.8 68.4 68.7 67.3 67.0
France           Unemployment rate 1.5 2.0 2.7 4.8 7.7 9.7 10.2 11.4 9.1
 Inflation rate1  4.1         4.1 7.8 10.2 11.0 3.6 2.7 1.3 1.7
 Nominal compensation per employee2          10.7 8.5 12.4 14.1 12.2 4.6 3.4 2.4 2.5
 Real compensation per employee3           6.4 4.2 4.2 3.6 1.1 0.9 0.6 1.1 0.8
 Labour income share4 75.3         74.0 73.3 77.3 78.9 73.8 70.1 69.0 68.9
UK           Unemployment rate 1.5 1.7 2.4 4.5 9.2 9.7 8.9 7.1 5.1
 Inflation rate1  2.8         4.3 9.3 15.2 9.1 5.0 5.1 2.7 1.6
 Nominal compensation per employee2          5.7 6.8 13.8 16.8 11.1 7.9 6.3 4.2 4.7
 Real compensation per employee3           2.8 2.5 4.2 1.4 1.8 2.8 1.1 1.5 3.1
 Labour income share4 72.0         72.2 72.9 73.3 73.1 72.4 73.9 70.7 72.9
USA           Unemployment rate 5.8 3.9 5.4 7.1 8.3 6.2 6.5 4.9 5.2
 Inflation rate1  1.2         3.0 5.6 7.2 6.6 3.5 3.1 1.7 1.8
 Nominal compensation per employee2          4.2 5.5 7.5 8.3 7.5 4.2 4.0 3.5 3.1
 Real compensation per employee3           2.9 2.5 1.7 1.0 0.9 0.6 0.9 1.7 1.3
 Labour income share4 70.8         69.6 71.4 69.6 69.8 68.6 68.3 67.1 66.9
1 deflator of private consumption, annual growth rate in % 
2 annual growth rate in % 
3 annual growth rate in % 
4 as percentage of GDP at current factor cost, total economy 
5 until 1990 West Germany 
Source: European Commission (2004), AMECO database, own calculations 
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Figure 1: Unemployment rate and real wage growth in EU15, 1960 - 2004, in %
Source: European Commission (2004), AMECO database
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Nominal wages and prices 
Instead of a close relation between real wage growth and unemployment, the post-Keynesian 
view advocated in the present paper claims a close relation between nominal wages and the 
price level. We should therefore observe a close long term relationship between nominal wage 
growth and inflation. Assuming mark-up pricing on unit labour costs, the relation between 
nominal wage growth and inflation is of course affected by productivity growth and changes 
in the mark-up. Therefore, we should have compared unit labour costs growth with inflation 
where the relation is very close (see Hein, Schulten and Truger 2004). Since productivity 
growth cannot be controlled by wage bargaining, however, we prefer to analyse the relation 
between nominal wage growth and inflation in the present paper. For the EU 15 countries this 
relation seems to be quite close, too (Figures 2). The same is true when we look at the data for 
Germany, France and the UK as well as for the US (Table 1): A rising (falling) growth rate of 
nominal compensation per employee is usually associated with rising (falling) inflation rates. 
Therefore, Keynes’s and the post-Keynesian view with respect to the relation between nomi-
nal wages and inflation are supported by the data. Decreasing nominal wage growth has been 
responsible for the considerable decline in inflation since the early 1980s. Excessive wage 
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moderation has recently even caused serious deflation risks in Germany, the largest EU 
economy, as the IMF (2003) has also acknowledged (see Hein/Schulten/Truger 2004). 
Figure 2: Inflation rate and nominal wage growth in EU15, 1960 - 2004, in %
Source: European Commission (2004),  AMECO database
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Unemployment, nominal wages and labour income shares 
Finally, we have to address the relation between unemployment, nominal wage growth and 
distribution. The new-Keynesian NAIRU-models as well as the post-Keynesian theories of 
wages and prices imply that rising (falling) unemployment should be associated with falling 
(rising) nominal wage growth, because unemployment is an important determinant of the 
trade unions’ power to push through higher nominal wages. Indeed, for the EU 15 as a whole 
and for Germany, France and the UK in particular, we find that the fall in nominal wage 
growth from its peak in the mid 1970s until the mid 1980s had been associated with a con-
tinuous increase in the rate of unemployment (Table 1 and Figure 3). In the US nominal wage 
growth only stopped increasing when unemployment peaked in the early 1980s. Slowing 
down the economy by means of restrictive monetary as well as fiscal policies, and increasing 
unemployment can be considered as the means to reduce nominal wage pressure and hence to 
bring down inflation. This instrument was introduced once again when unemployment de-
creased in the late 1980s/early 1990s and nominal wage growth started to accelerate. The re-
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cession in the early 1990s increased unemployment and limited the capacity of trade unions to 
push through higher nominal wage hikes. Slow nominal wage growth has been imposed since 
then by persistently high unemployment in the EU 15 as a whole and in Germany and France 
in particular. In the UK and in the US, however, falling unemployment improved the condi-
tions for faster nominal wage growth in the second half of the 1990s. The recession in 2001 
with rising unemployment put a stop to accelerating nominal wage growth in the US. 
Figure 3: Unemployment rate and nominal wage growth in EU15, 1960 - 2004, in %
Source: European Commission (2004), AMECO database
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Nominal wage moderation and the associated dampening of nominal unit labour cost growth 
imposed by high unemployment is not completely passed on to prices by firms in each period 
in each country. Accordingly, unemployment may have major effects on functional income 
distribution (Figure 4, Table 1). In the EU 15 as a whole and in Germany and in France in 
particular, a rising tendency of unemployment rates since the mid 1970s has been accompa-
nied by a tendency of the labour income share to fall since the early 1980s until the present. In 
the US, however, there seems to have been a tendency of the labour income share to fall since 
the early 1970s which is quite independent of the development of unemployment (Table 1) 
whereas the UK displayed a remarkable constancy in functional income distribution instead of 
a considerable increase in unemployment from the mid 1970s until the mid 1980s and a de-
crease since the mid 1990s. 
 13
Figure 4: Unemployment rate and labour income share in EU15, 1960 - 2004, in %
Source: European Commission (2004), AMECO database
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We can now sum up our empirical findings as follows: 1). There is obviously no clear positive 
relation between real wage growth and unemployment as expected by neoclassical or new-
Keynesian models. On the contrary, the data for the different countries advocate a tendency 
towards an adverse relation, i.e. a slowdown of real wage growth in periods of rising unem-
ployment and acceleration in periods of falling unemployment. A crucial reason for this is that 
periods of high growth and falling unemployment are usually accompanied by rising produc-
tivity growth (Verdoorn’s law) allowing for higher real wage growth without compressing 
profits or generating inflation. Thus, improving employment and rising real wage rates can be 
considered as the joint result of a healthy performance in the goods market 2). There is a clear 
indication of a close and positive relation between nominal wage growth and inflation. 
Keynes’s and the post-Keynesian view on the primary effect of wage variations on prices are 
confirmed. 3). Unemployment has a clear cut inverse effect on nominal wage growth. Increas-
ing unemployment by means of slowing down effective demand in the goods market has been 
the tool to bring down nominal wage pressure and hence inflation. 4). The dampening effect 
of unemployment on nominal wage growth has not only brought down inflation, but has also 
had a negative effect on labour income shares in the EU as a whole and in Germany and 
France in particular. Here, this contributed to the relatively weak macroeconomic perform-
 14
ance in the 1990s compared to the UK and the US and to the persistence of high unemploy-
ment in continental Europe.6 
 
4. The impact of unemployment on wages and collective bargaining 
The theoretical and empirical arguments we provided in the previous section clearly disprove 
the basic assumption of the European economic mainstream that real wage developments de-
termine the level of unemployment. On the contrary there seems to be more an inverse rela-
tion because periods of relatively low unemployment (1960s and 1970s) showed relatively 
high increases of real wages while in periods of high unemployment (1980s and 1990s) real 
wage increases were comparatively low. The distinct correlation between high unemployment 
and falling nominal wage growth as well as a decreasing share of labour income since the 
1980s makes it clear that unemployment has had an important social function in decreasing 
inflation and regulating the distributional conflict between labour and capital.  
It was Karl Marx (1867: 762-801) who was one of the first to analyse very precisely the social 
function of what he called the “industrial reserve army” of unemployed which to him was the 
unavoidable result of capital accumulation regularly undermining the bargaining power of 
trade unions. Later, it was Michal Kalecki (1943) in particular who put the focus on the “po-
litical aspects of full employment”. Since the employment question is always embedded in the 
distributional conflict between different social groups and classes it would be naive to assume 
that all these groups would have the same strong interest in diminishing unemployment. For 
“business leaders” a certain rate of unemployment has always been an important tool to safe-
guard “discipline in the factories” and to avoid the workers and their trade unions from be-
coming too strong. Therefore, “their class instinct tells them that lasting full employment is 
unsound from their point of view, and that unemployment is an integral part of the ‘normal’ 
capitalist system” (ibid.: 351). The NAIRU concept seems to give these class interests a mod-
ern expression and might also be read as the “non accruing indiscipline rate of unemploy-
ment” (Petit 1998). 
High unemployment weakens the bargaining power of trade unions in at least three ways: 
First, in most European countries the sharp raise of unemployment in the 1980s and 1990s 
went along with a large decline in trade union membership (Ebbinghaus and Visser 2000, 
                                                          
6 See Hein and Truger (2004a, 2004c) for a more extensive analysis of the weak economic performance 
of the EMU countries caused by macroeconomic mismanagement. 
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Boeri et. al. 2001). The losses of jobs were particularly high in those sectors (e.g. manufactur-
ing or public sector) which traditionally showed a high rate of trade union density. Most trade 
unions have had great difficulties in recruiting new members in the expanding sectors (e.g. 
private services) and the overall trade union density has shown a steady decline. There are 
only four European countries (Belgium, Denmark, Finland and Sweden) in which the rate of 
unionisation has been rather stable or has even been increasing. All these countries, however, 
belong to the so-called “Ghent-system”, where the unemployment insurance is administrated 
by union-affiliated institutions. Under such a system increasing unemployment is a further 
incentive for employees to join the trade unions (Boeri et.al. 2001: 22). 
Secondly, against the background of persistently high unemployment in the 1980s and 1990s 
most European countries have followed the policy recommendations by the economic main-
stream and have started to deregulate labour market institutions (for an overview see Lodovici 
2000). The core of these deregulation strategies has been a relaxation of employment protec-
tion, a legal widening of the possibilities to use various forms of non-permanent employment 
(notably fixed-term contracts, temporary agency work and casual or seasonal work) and a 
reduction of the amount and duration of unemployment benefits in order to reduce the so-
called “reservation wage”. As a result in many European countries the proportion of employ-
ees working in precarious jobs with fixed-term contracts and often low payment has shown a 
significant increase (European Commission 2003b). This has also contributed to a further 
weakening of trade unions, because it is much more difficult for them to organise employees 
working in precarious jobs (Boeri et. al. 2001: 24ff.). At the same time, the growing impor-
tance of precarious employment puts significant downward pressure on the working condi-
tions of “regular” employees. 
Thirdly, high unemployment has had a strong impact on the institutions of collective bargain-
ing and the dominant forms of wage formation (on the following see: Traxler et. al. 2001: 
105-143). In the 1950s and 1960s most European countries established multi-employer bar-
gaining systems with negotiations at sectoral or even at national levels and a national coordi-
nation of wage policy. Under the conditions of full employment employers were particularly 
interested in multi-employer bargaining because it helped to secure wage moderation by con-
taining inter-firm competition for scarce labour. Moreover, the employers supported corpora-
tist incomes policy as an opportunity to prevent trade unions from taking advantage of their 
strong bargaining power at company level.  
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For the unions the multi-employer bargaining and corporatist incomes policy had ambiguous 
effects. On the one hand, it allowed them to follow a “solidaristic wage policy” aiming to ful-
fil the principle of “equal pay for equal work” and to reduce wage inequalities between differ-
ent groups of employees.7 Furthermore, corporatist arrangements strengthened trade union 
influence on the overall policy development in areas such as economic, social and labour 
market policy. On the other hand, trade unions had to accept a policy of wage moderation 
with real wage increases in line with average productivity growth. In practice , however, good 
performing companies often paid above the collectively agreed rate to attract certain groups of 
employees and, therewith, caused a substantial wage drift. Considering this, in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s it were the trade unions which first of all called for a strengthening of com-
pany bargaining in order to regain the influence on actual wage developments. 
The fundamental changes in the power relations between employers and trade unions caused 
by the sharp increase in unemployment in the 1980s went along with a principle shift of inter-
est regarding the institutions of collective bargaining. From then on it was the employers who 
demanded a more or less radical decentralisation of collective bargaining, while the trade un-
ions tried to defend multi-employer bargaining and coordinated wage policies as an institu-
tional barrier against further loss of bargaining power.  
At first sight, one could get the impression that trade unions have been rather successful be-
cause during the last two decades none of the EU 15 countries – with the exception of the UK 
– have shown a radical shift from multi-employer to company bargaining (Schulten 2004a: 
170-178, Traxler et. al. 112-143). Without such radical changes, however, there has been a 
more or less far reaching decentralisation within the framework of traditional multi-employer 
bargaining systems. This has included forms of “controlled” or “organised” decentralisation 
whereby employers and trade unions established multi-level bargaining systems and/or agreed 
upon the introduction of opening-clauses into sectoral agreements which determine some cri-
teria for diverging company agreements. It has also included forms of “wild” or “non-
organised” decentralisation whereby companies simply contravene valid collective agree-
ments.  
In addition to that, in the 1990s many European countries were faced by the creation of new 
bargaining arrangements which explicitly aimed at a policy of wage restraint in order to in-
crease competitiveness which became widely regarded as the decisive prerequisite for the 
                                                          
7 On the principle of solidaristic wage policy and theoretical foundations of trade union wage policies in 
Europe see Schulten (2004a, 2004b). 
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safeguarding and creation of employment (Bieling and Schulten 2003, Schulten 2004a: 245-
275). These new bargaining arrangements could be found both at company and at national 
level. At company level so-called “pacts for employment and competitiveness” have emerged 
following the principle of “concession bargaining” whereby employees had to agree to labour 
cost reductions (e. g. extension of working time or reduction of pay) in exchange for limited 
job guarantees given by the company (Sisson 2001). At national level many European coun-
tries saw a renaissance of tripartite social pacts which established a new form of “competitive 
corporatism” the primary aim of which was to secure a policy of wage restraint with real 
wage increases below productivity growth in order to strengthen national competitiveness 
(Fajertag and Pochet 2000). 
To sum up, the persistently high level of unemployment in Europe has already led to a notable 
deregulation of labour market institutions. All these changes have contributed to a significant 
weakening of trade unions and to a transformation of collective bargaining which have be-
come more and more dominated by the principle of “concession bargaining”, whereby wage 
restraint and cuts in labour costs are regarded as the “magic formula” to create employment. 
In practice, however, none of these institutional changes have led to a substantial reduction of 
European unemployment so far. As various recent studies have shown, there is no statistically 
evident correlation between labour market institutions and employment performance (Aidt 
and Tzannatos 2002, Baker et.al. 2002, Hein and Truger 2004c, OECD 2004). Neither the 
level of union density nor the standard of statutory employment protection or the nature of the 
collective bargaining systems - nor the regulations of the welfare state - have clear cut effects 
on unemployment.  
The only statistically significant correlation could be found between labour market institutions 
and the overall wage dispersion. A higher union density, stronger employment protection and 
centralised or coordinated collective bargaining tend to compress the wage structure. Conse-
quently, in the 1990s the deregulation of labour market institutions contributed to an increase 
of wage differentials and an extension of low wage sectors in many European countries 
(Schulten 2004a: 200ff.). In contrast to what is maintained by the economic mainstream there 
is, however, no clear trade-off between employment performance and wage differentiation 
(Howell and Huebler 2004). While low wage differentials have an important positive impact 
on income equality and social cohesion they can go along with both a low or high level of 
employment. All in all, there is a strong “indication that quite different institutional arrange-
ments are capable of obtaining similar levels of macroeconomic performance” (OECD 2004: 
130). 
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5. Conclusion 
At the Lisbon European Council in March 2000, the European Union set itself the goal to “re-
gain the conditions for full employment” by 2010. In order to reach that goal the EU should 
“become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world” aiming 
at an average annual economic growth rate of 3%. Referring to the “European social model” 
the EU intends to combine “sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and 
greater social cohesion” (European Council 2000). Later, the Barcelona European Council in 
March 2002 confirmed the notion of the “European social model” which should be “based on 
good economic performance, a high level of social protection and education and social dia-
logue.” Consequently, the European Council called for “balanced efforts on both the eco-
nomic and social fronts” (European Council 2002). 
Considering the poor economic developments in recent years, the EU seems to be further than 
ever away from achieving the Lisbon targets. Moreover, with the currently dominating eco-
nomic policy approach as laid down in the “Broad Economic Policy Guidelines” and the 
“European Employment Strategy” the EU has no convincing strategy to overcome the prob-
lem of mass unemployment.8 The EU policy recommendations made regarding wage policy 
and collective bargaining are particularly misleading because they have a strong deflationary 
bias and would contribute to further redistribution from labour to capital income. Instead of 
continuing with a policy of wage restraint as demanded by the EU, wage increases should be 
in line with average growth of productivity plus the inflation target set by the ECB. Such a 
growth and stability oriented wage policy would help to stabilise consumer demand and 
would give the ECB the opportunity for a more expansive monetary policy without a negative 
impact for price stability.  
The EU demand for more wage differentiation is not convincing from an economic point of 
view and would further undermine the notion of the European social model which aims at 
“high-road development” combining high productivity and equality. Instead, the EU should 
think about strategies on how to contain the already existing low-wage sector in Europe, e.g. 
by the introduction of a European minimum wage.9 Besides this, the EU should not call for a 
further decentralisation of collective bargaining but for a re-strengthening of multi-employer 
                                                          
8  For a more detailed discussion of the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines see: Hein and Niechoj (2004). 
For a critical assessment of the European Employment Strategy see: Watt (2004). 
9  Interesting proposals for the introduction of a European minimum wage (defined as a certain minimum 
related to national purchasing power) have recently been developed by the French Parti Socialiste (see: 
Filoche 2004).  
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bargaining at sectoral and national levels. Coordinated collective bargaining is an indispensa-
ble precondition for a macroeconomic orientation of wage policy as well as for a restriction of 
growing wage inequality.  
Considering the new macroeconomic regime in Europe with integrated product markets and – 
at least within EMU – a common monetary policy, what is finally required is a European co-
ordination of wage policy. The latter would have to overcome the current ‘beggar-thy-
neighbour’ approach whereby European countries try to improve their price competitiveness 
through a policy of wage restraint or unpaid working time extension increasing the risks of a 
deflationary spiral in Europe (Hein, Schulten & Truger 2004). In recent years it has been the 
European trade unions which have started some political initiatives aiming at a European co-
ordination of wage policy in order to prevent competitive underbidding of labour costs and 
wage dumping (Schulten 2003, 2004a, 2004b). So far, these initiatives have not only had to 
tackle various political and institutional difficulties but have also completely lacked any sup-
port from European employers’ associations and EU institutions. From the employers point of 
view this is understandable because they have considerable advantages in the current situa-
tion. From the EU perspective, however, this is rather incomprehensible since a more growth 
and employment-creating macroeconomic regime would require a European coordination of 
wage policy in order to achieve macroeconomic policy coordination between monetary, fiscal 
and wage policy.10 
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Appendix 
Figure 1a: Unemployment rate and real wage growth in Germany, 1960 - 2004, in %
Source: European Commission (2004), AMECO database
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Figure 1b: Unemployment rate and real wage growth in France, 1960 - 2004, in %
Source: European Commission (2004), AMECO database
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Figure 1c: Unemployment rate and real wage growth in the UK, 1960 - 2004, in %
Source: European Commission (2004), AMECO database
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Figure 1d: Unemployment rate and real wage growth in the USA, 1960 - 2004, in %
Source: European Commission (2004), AMECO database
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Figure 2a: Inflation rate and nominal wage growth in Germany, 1960 - 2004, in %
Source: European Commission (2004),  AMECO database
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Figure 2b: Inflation rate and nominal wage growth in France, 1960 - 2004, in %
Source: European Commission (2004),  AMECO database
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Figure 2c: Inflation rate and nominal wage growth in the UK, 1960 - 2004, in %
Source: European Commission (2004),  AMECO database
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Figure 2d: Inflation rate and nominal wage growth in the USA, 1960 - 2004, in %
Source: European Commission (2004),  AMECO database
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Figure 3a: Unemployment rate & nominal wage growth in Germany, 1960- 2004, in %
Source: European Commission (2004), AMECO database
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Figure 3b: Unemployment rate and nominal wage growth in France, 1960 - 2004, in %
Source: European Commission (2004), AMECO database
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Figure 3c: Unemployment rate and nominal wage growth in the UK, 1960 - 2004, in %
Source: European Commission (2004), AMECO database
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Figure 4a: Unemployment rate and labour income share in Germany, 1960 - 2004, in %
Source: European Commission (2004), AMECO database
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Figure 4b: Unemployment rate and labour income share in France, 1960 - 2004, in %
Source: European Commission (2004), AMECO database
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Figure 4c: Unemployment rate and labour income share in the UK, 1960 - 2004, in %
Source: European Commission (2004), AMECO database
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Figure 4d: Unemployment rate and labour income share in the USA, 1960 - 2004, in %
Source: European Commission (2004), AMECO database
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